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Abstract
Moral judgments are known to change in response to
changes in external conditions. But how variable are
moral judgments over time in the absence of environ-
mental variation? The moral domain has been described
in terms of five moral foundations, categories that ap-
pear to capture moral judgment across cultures. We ex-
amined the temporal consistency of repeated responses
to the moral foundations questionnaire over short time
periods, fitted a set of mixed effects models to the data
and compared them. We found correlations between
changes in participant responses for different founda-
tions over time, suggesting a structure with at least
two underlying stochastic processes: one for moral judg-
ments involving harm and fairness, and another for
moral judgments related to loyalty, authority, and pu-
rity.
Keywords: morality, moral foundations theory, consis-
tency, variability
Introduction
Morality is a vital part of who we are. A person’s moral
beliefs are tied into their identity (Aquino & Reed II,
2002; Aquino et al., 2009) – humans believe that if their
moral values changed, they would change (Heiphetz et
al., 2016). Are people’s intuitions about this correct?
Are our moral values consistent over time?
Since moral beliefs tend to be associated with a per-
son’s sense of identity, we should expect people’s under-
lying moral values to largely endure over short time pe-
riods. Yet, there have been many recent explorations of
moral inconsistency. These have included manipulations
of two types – manipulations of response timing, or ma-
nipulations by exposure to new information or decisions.
In terms of timing, we now know that time-limited de-
cisions appear to be more altruistic (Rand et al., 2012)
and that choices can be influenced by forcing decisions
at a specific point in time (Pa¨rnamets et al., 2015), indi-
cating that the actual decision outcome is time-sensitive.
Regarding information or decisions, dishonest behaviour
increases future dishonesty (Garrett et al., 2016; Engel-
mann & Fehr, 2016). A morally good action makes a
subsequent morally bad action more appealing and vice
versa, effects known as moral cleansing and moral licens-
ing (Merritt et al., 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Expo-
sure to a moral dilemma leads to belief revision in moral
decisions that persists for multiple hours (Horne et al.,
2015).
The fact that changes in external circumstances can
influence the outcomes of moral decisions is hardly sur-
prising assuming morality evolved as an adaptive strat-
egy (Machery & Mallon, 2010). Likewise, viewing moral
judgment as a decision process, we would expect the
effects of changed response timing on general decision-
making (McClelland, 1979; Usher & McClelland, 2001)
to transfer into the moral domain. But in the absense
of such manipulations, are our moral judgments funda-
mentally noisy? Outside of the moral domain, there is
evidence in decision making research that people’s de-
cisions vary stochastically even in cases where external
conditions remain constant (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951).
We are interested in exploring whether there is a cor-
responding moral variability beyond the actual decision
process: are our moral values different from moment to
moment, even in the absence of new information or ma-
nipulations of response timing?
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) provides a way to
look at this. It is based on a dominant model of morality,
the social intuitionist model, according to which moral
choices are made primarily intuitively and then justified
post hoc (Haidt, 2001). MFT maps out the moral do-
main in terms of six fundamental hidden parameters that
appear to capture an individual’s moral judgment (Gra-
ham et al., 2009), enabling us to distinguish between
conservative and liberal political profiles on the basis of
an agent’s foundation weights. This idea that there are
foundational categories that guide intuitive moral judge-
ment has the potential to explain people’s tendency to
disagree on moral issues, and predict future moral judge-
ment based on the individual scores. If we can find a
systematic structure in the stochastic changes of differ-
ent foundation scores beyond merely a layer of noise, this
would point towards moral variability, rather than just
motor variability or variability in how the response scale
is used.
In line with the aforementioned results indicating tem-
poral consistency, moral foundation scores appear sta-
ble over longer time periods; Graham et al. (2011)
tested participants again after approximately a month
and found that their moral foundation scores exhibited
test-retest reliability. Yet, effects such as moral licensing
and moral cleansing – where the outcome of an indi-
vidual’s moral decision influences subsequent moral de-
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cisions, even decisions made by others in their ingroup
(Kouchaki, 2011), over the course of single experimen-
tal sessions and thus shorter timescales – suggest the
possibility of an interaction between moral foundations.
Moreover, the list of known moral foundations is likely
incomplete – a view shared by moral foundations theo-
rists (Haidt & Joseph, 2011).
Viewing moral decisions as a sampling process from a
distribution that represents an agent’s moral values, we
can use the framework provided by MFT to investigate
hidden parameters which predict an individual’s moral
variability. Conversely, observing within-subject vari-
ability over time can help us understand to which extent
individual moral variability reflects between-individual
variability that has been used to support the existence
of MFT (Graham et al., 2011). Are we all sometimes
a little bit more conservative and sometimes a little bit
more liberal in our moral judgments and values?
In this paper, we aim to discuss the extent to which
randomness plays a role in moral judgment over time by
collecting responses to the moral foundations question-
naire delivered repeatedly. We subsequently fit a set of
models to the data and compare them. If the variability
we observe stems merely from randomness in the deci-
sion process, we expect variation in individual responses
to be explained by a single noise-generating process. We
find evidence for at least two separate stochastic pro-
cesses associated with different sets of moral foundations,
indicating the existence of inherent variability in moral
values.
Method
Participants
The participant pool consisted of 80 psychology under-
graduate students (mean age 19 years, 90% female).
14 participants were excluded from the analysis due to
wrong responses on the two ‘catch’ trials, as done by
Graham et al. (2011).
Materials
The original moral foundations questionnaire (MFQ30)
asks participants to respond using a 1–6 scale; to enhance
precision and avoid subjects simply recalling previous
answers, the participants in our task had to use a slider
bar to indicate their responses instead:
not at all a lot
In addition, our version of the questionnaire contained
four further questions (see Figure 1). Those were cho-
sen so as not to correspond in any obvious way to the
five foundations measured in the MFQ30, nor to the re-
cent addition of the liberty foundation (Graham et al.,
2012; Haidt, 2012). We added these questions because
we wanted the same number of presumably neutral tri-
als as the number of foundation-related questions – the
MFQ30 includes six question for each foundation but
only two neutral ‘catch’ items.
When you decide whether
something is right or wrong,
to what extent is the follow-
ing consideration relevant to
your thinking?
Please read the following sentence
and indicate your agreement or dis-
agreement:
Harm:
1. Whether or not someone
suffered emotionally
2. Whether or not someone
cared for someone weak
or vulnerable
3. Whether or not someone
was cruel
4. Compassion for those who are
suffering is the most crucial
virtue.
5. One of the worst things a person
could do is hurt a defenseless an-
imal.
6. It can never be right to kill a hu-
man being.
Fairness:
1. Whether or not some
people were treated dif-
ferently than others
2. Whether or not someone
acted unfairly
3. Whether or not someone
was denied his or her
rights
4. When the government makes
laws, the number one principle
should be ensuring that everyone
is treated fairly.
5. Justice is the most important re-
quirement for a society.
6. I think it’s morally wrong that
rich children inherit a lot of
money while poor children in-
herit nothing.
Loyalty:
1. Whether or not some-
one’s action showed love
for his or her country
2. Whether or not someone
did something to betray
his or her group
3. Whether or not someone
showed a lack of loyalty
4. I am proud of my country’s his-
tory.
5. People should be loyal to their
family members, even when they
have done something wrong.
6. It is more important to be a
team player than to express one-
self.
Authority:
1. Whether or not someone
showed a lack of respect
for authority
2. Whether or not someone
conformed to the tradi-
tions of society
3. Whether or not an action
caused chaos or disorder
4. Respect for authority is some-
thing all children need to learn.
5. Men and women each have dif-
ferent roles to play in society.
6. If I were a soldier and disagreed
with my commanding officer’s
orders, I would obey anyway be-
cause that is my duty.
Purity:
1. Whether or not someone
violated standards of pu-
rity and decency
2. Whether or not someone
did something disgusting
3. Whether or not someone
acted in a way that God
would approve of
4. People should not do things that
are disgusting, even if no one is
harmed.
5. I would call some acts wrong on
the grounds that they are unnat-
ural.
6. Chastity is an important and
valuable virtue.
Neutral:
1. Whether or not someone
was good at math
2. Whether or not someone
told the truth (*)
3. Whether or not someone
made a smart decision (*)
4. It is better to do good than to
do bad.
5. If one’s children live a happy life,
it is better to have children than
not to have children. (*)
6. Destroying beautiful things that
took long to create is worse than
destroying things that took less
time. (*)
Figure 1: Moral foundations questionnaire. Questions
added by us are marked with (*).
Procedure
The questionnaire was presented six times in randomised
order, with a word search task before the last two tri-
als. In each trial, one of the two question types was
displayed (see Figure 1, left and right side, respectively),
along with one of the statements for that question type.
Randomisation was implemented so that each statement
was shown to the participant exactly once in each block:
The set of questions within each block was shuﬄed, and
presented within the block in randomised order, so no
regular pattern in the order of foundations would occur.
3286
After four blocks, a word search task1 was shown for
6 minutes to provide a timed break2: Participants had
to find and mark words in a 18x18 letter square filled
with a selection of words and random letters, based on
the WordFind.js library (Scheidel, 2012). With the ex-
ception of the timed word search task, participants pro-
vided responses at their own pace. The experiment took
approximately 20-25 minutes to complete.
Results
Since participant responses are indicated using slider
bars, foundation scores change between the blocks (par-
ticipants will be unable to recall the exact position of
the slider for previous trials). But beyond the expected
variation resulting from differences in participant’s slider
operation accuracy, is there a relationship between these
changes in different moral foundation scores?
Means
As found by Graham et al. (2011), we anticipated and
found our psychology undergraduate subject pool in the
UK to remain largely at the liberal end of the U.S. polit-
ical spectrum. Welch’s t-test shows that the differences
between the means for harm and fairness (p=.16) and
for loyalty and authority (p=.44) are not significant. All
other pairs of means indeed differ significantly (p<.001).
In particular, the first two foundation means differ sig-
nificantly from the last three, with higher subject scores
for harm (M = 72.9, SD = 24.6) and fairness (M = 70.3,
SD = 23.6) and lower scores for loyalty (M = 51.1, SD =
27.1), authority (M = 48.8, SD = 26.1) and purity (M =
42.1, SD = 28.8). The between-subject standard devia-
tion is notably larger than the within-subject standard
deviation (see Figure 3), supporting the MFT framework
for examining between-subject differences.
A within-subjects ANOVA3 showed a main effect of
both foundation (F(5,325) = 72.67, p<.001) and block
(F(5,325)=6.26, p<.001) on average slider bar values,
as well as an interaction between foundation and block
(F(25,1625)=1.764, p=0.011). But we are mainly in-
terested in changes in the absence of new information,
and Figure 5 suggests that the very first block in which
the whole questionnaire was new to the participant qual-
itatively differs from the others. Excluding the first
1We removed words such as ’excellent’ from the task to
reduce the likelihood that word valence in this task would
influence future participant responses. This quiz block was
followed by three more blocks.
2Due to an off-by-one error in our code, the first statement
from the block after the word search task was erroneously
displayed before the word search task. We excluded this error
trial from the analysis.
3It should be noted that in this ANOVA, we are treat-
ing the block number as a factor variable rather than a nu-
meric variable due to the non-linear relationship between
block number and participant response; including the block
number as a numeric variable yields qualitatively the same
results.
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Figure 2: Spider plot of means for each foundation and
block.
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Figure 3: Average slider value for each response, and
the average of within-subject standard deviations. The
catch trials and the baseline level are marked in blue.
block from the analysis indeed makes the effects of block
(F(4,260)=6.26, p=.47) and the interaction effect be-
tween foundation and block (F(20,1300) = 1.201, p=.24)
in the ANOVA above no longer significant: While moral
foundation scores differ between Block 1 and the other
blocks, for the later blocks alone, this is no longer true.
Variability over time
We also expected that within-foundation variance, i.e.
the variance between participant responses to the sets of
questions for each respective foundation, would decrease
over time: As time passes, people’s certainty which
choice they will make will increase as they get more fa-
miliar with the questionnaire. Moreover, we thought we
might be able to observe a shift towards more extreme
values for each question over time – as people become
increasingly familiar with the set of questions they will
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encounter, there would be less need to for caution about
new options which are more or less morally upsetting
than the previous maximum or minimum, respectively.
We computed residual slider values by subtracting the
within-subject mean for each foundation from the slider
values for each trial. The two hypotheses above can be
rephrased as: The slider residual variance for each par-
ticipant and block decreases as a reflection of the increase
in certainty; and the average absolute residual value in-
creases over time as a result of the decision drifting to-
wards the extremes.
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Within−foundation changes
Figure 4: Changes over time, by foundation. The colours
represent the different blocks.
In fact, we found no significant effect of block num-
ber on foundation variance: Again, an ANOVA only
yields significant results for the variance hypothesis
(F(5,325)=18.71, p<.001) and the absolute residual
hypothesis (F(5,325)=47.4, p<.001) if we are taking
the very first block into account – here, a slight de-
crease after the first block can be spotted (see Fig-
ure 5). If we are looking at only the other blocks,
we do not find any significant change in the variance
(F(4,260)=1.90, p=.11), nor in the absolute slider resid-
ual (F(4,260)=1.22, p=.30).
Between-foundation variability
One hypothesis is that changes in moral foundations that
are opposed with respect to their representation on the
political spectrum, such as harm and purity, will balance
each other out – that is, they are negatively correlated
(Fig. 6a). Each person may have a constant morality
‘budget’, and thus an increase in a moral foundation
score will inevitably be accompanied by a decrease in
others. This would imply that people’s position on the
liberal-conservative spectrum might not be fixed. An-
other hypothesis is that changes in opposing moral foun-
dations are positively correlated (Fig. 6b). This would
for instance be the case if people’s moral profile was
0
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Figure 5: Absolute value and within-subject standard
deviation of slider residual over time
indeed fixed, and the sampled moral foundation scores
are scaled by a time-dependent factor. Alternatively,
changes in different moral foundations may not be cor-
related at all.
Harm: Purity:
(a)
Harm: Purity:
(b)
Figure 6: Relative changes in foundation scores
We did not find evidence for any of these relationships
between participant scores for different foundations. On
the contrary, the changes in foundation scores over time
were not particularly large.
To test for interactions between changes in different
foundation scores, we modelled the data using mixed ef-
fects models with a full covariance matrix and a diago-
nal covariance matrix, respectively. We created dummy
coded variables for each foundation. Since we did not de-
tect any notable change in the means after the first block,
we now focused on the variability and removed the influ-
ence of the means entirely by modelling slider residuals:
we calculated the mean slider value for each question for
each participant, and subtracted it from the raw slider
values. We used residuals for each question rather than
for each foundation score because of the differences in re-
sponses to the different questions within each foundation
(see Figure 4). Furthermore, we excluded the first block
in which all information had been newly introduced from
the analysis. We fitted two models to the data: First,
a model including a full covariance matrix and thus al-
lowing for interactions between the different foundations,
and second, a model with a diagonal covariance matrix
reflecting the assumption that sampling occurs for each
foundation individually.
As a baseline model, we used a model assuming a ran-
dom slider residual for each participant and block, sam-
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pled from the same distribution for each foundation (ran-
dom noise model). The models for the slider residual yi jkl
of Participant i in Block j for a question or statement l
relating to Foundation k are:
yi jkl = ui j +ui jk + εi jkl , (M1-M3)
with ui j ∼N (0,σ), and
ui jk = 0 (M1)
ui j1
ui j2
ui j3
ui j4
ui j5
∼N
0,

σ11 σ12 σ13 σ14 σ15
σ21 σ22 σ23 σ24 σ25
σ31 σ32 σ33 σ34 σ35
σ41 σ42 σ43 σ44 σ45
σ51 σ52 σ53 σ54 σ55

 (M2)

ui j1
ui j2
ui j3
ui j4
ui j5
∼N
0,

σ11 0 0 0 0
0 σ22 0 0 0
0 0 σ33 0 0
0 0 0 σ44 0
0 0 0 0 σ55

 (M3)
The model M2 (χ2(10) = 26.98, p= .003) differs signifi-
cantly from the baseline model M1. Comparing the mod-
els M1-M3 to each other suggests that M2 (BIC=71058)
has a lower BIC value than M1 (BIC=70960) and M3
(BIC=70993). M2, which has a full covariance matrix,
shows an interesting pattern of dependencies between the
different foundation types:
Foundation Harm Fair Loya Auth
Fair 1
Loya -0.86 -0.86
Auth -0.95 -0.95 0.95
Puri -0.7 -0.7 0.64 0.80
Responses for harm and fairness appear to be posi-
tively correlated with each other and negatively corre-
lated with responses for the other foundations, and vice
versa. This would be less surprising if it was merely cap-
turing a between-participant relationship between foun-
dation scores. Note however that this model describes
the slider residuals which add up to zero for each foun-
dation and participant – yet, this result suggests that
participants who drag the slider bar a bit further to the
right for harm-related questions than in the last block
will do a similar thing with the fairness-question slider,
but the opposite with sliders on loyalty, authority and
purity trials.
Is there some overlap between which property of
morality harm and fairness on the one hand and loyalty,
authority and purity on the other hand are measuring?
Since the mean foundation scores for harm and fairness,
and the scores for loyalty, authority, and purity seem
similar to each other (see Figure 2), we introduced alter-
native models that only distinguish between these two
groups instead of the individual foundations.
To find out if we could confirm the five-dimensional
moral foundations structure, we fitted a set of linear
mixed effects models to the data. As an alternative,
we dummy-coded two foundation types (the ‘individual-
ising’ foundations harm and fairness and the ‘binding’
foundations loyalty, authority, and purity (Graham et
al., 2009)). Again, we fitted a full covariance model
and a diagonal covariance model to the data, adding the
two models below to our list of candidate models. They
are describing the slider residual yi jml of Participant i in
Block j for a question l of Foundation type m:
yi jml = ui j +ui jm + εi jml , (M4-M5)
with(
ui j1
ui j2
)
∼N
(
0,
[
σ11 σ12
σ21 σ22
])
(M4)(
ui j1
ui j2
)
∼N
(
0,
[
σ11 0
0 σ22
])
(M5)
We find that out of these, the model M5 differs signifi-
cantly from the baseline model (χ2(2) = 27.85, p< .001).
Comparing M4 (BIC=70960) and M5 (BIC=70951) to
the models above suggests that M5 is preferable to M2
and M4. Thus, it appears that from a model comparison
perspective, the main distinction in the moral founda-
tion framework lies in the two different foundation types
rather than the individual foundations, and that at this
level of description, between-foundation correlations do
not play a prominent role.
Discussion
We found that people showed moral variability even in
the absence of new information or time pressure. This
moral variability is distinguishable from response vari-
ability because we found two random processes that were
associated with different sets of moral foundations. The
evidence for MFT is based on an analysis of between-
individual responses to the MFQ (Graham et al., 2011),
and much of this may actually be due to the within-
individual variability that we have found. This within-
individual variability may also be what allows timing
interventions to have an effect (Pa¨rnamets et al., 2015),
and might potentially even allow to influence the out-
comes of value-related decisions (such as election re-
sults).
While for our dataset a simpler two-type model was
preferable to the more complex model including five
moral foundations, we hesitate to draw general conclu-
sions about the number of moral foundations due to the
small size and relative cultural homogeneity of our sub-
ject pool. Yet, our brief glimpse at candidates for ad-
ditional foundations suggests the possibility of a wider
underlying structure of which MFT has captured but a
part.
A common criticism of MFT is that the known moral
foundations are unlikely to capture moral judgment in its
entirety (Suhler & Churchland, 2011). We had expected
3289
our added questions to be rated similarly irrelevant to
morality as the more conservative moral foundations in
our liberal subject pool. Somewhat surprisingly, the re-
sponses to our added, ‘neutral’ foundation appear to be
less neutral overall. We chose the four additional state-
ments in the neutral foundation because we suspected
that they might turn out to be morally relevant. Fig-
ure 3 suggests that questions 2 and 5 in particular (see
Figures 1 and 4) indeed resonate with our participants’
values. While the act of lying may arguably be related
to the purity scale, it is remarkably more morally rele-
vant than any of the purity questions. This particularly
utilitarian view on having children also appears to lie
outside of the given scales.
Interesting open questions remain that reach beyond
refining and expanding MFT. While we observe a range
of scores for different moral foundations, we do not yet
understand the actual decision process: How are differ-
ent moral values integrated in a decision between options
that are morally relevant for more than one moral foun-
dation, or options that are uncertain? Which impact
does moral variability have on the kinds of moral deci-
sions we face every day?
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